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LAWt
John N. Hazardtt
No more startling evidence of "new thinking"1 among So-
viet policy makers formulating attitudes toward foreign policy
and international law could be found than Soviet Foreign Minis-
ter Shevardnadze's admission in 1989 that the much-debated
t The third annual Blaine Sloan Lecture was delivered on March 15, 1990.
Presented in honor of Blaine Sloan, Professor Emeritus of International Law and
Organization at Pace University, the lecture series is delivered each year to the
University and Law School community in order to promote scholarly debate in
international law.
tf B.A., LL.B., J.S.D., LL.D.; Nash Professor Emeritus of Law, Columbia
University.
The phrase "new thinking" first appears in M. GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA: NEw
THINKING FOR OUR COUNTRY AND THE WORLD xiii (Perennial Libr. ed. 1988). "The funda-
mental principle of the new political outlook is very simple: nuclear war cannot be a
means of achieving political, economic, ideological or any other goals." Id. at 126 (em-
phasis in original).
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Krasnoyarsk Radar Installation had violated an international
treaty.2 For four years Soviet officials had refused to accept the
American charge that the installation violated the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty.8 The installation is to be dismantled.
In the same speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the For-
eign Minister provided another surprise. He declared that the
sending of Soviet troops to Afghanistan "had violated the norms
of behavior and gone against human interests."4 Seven years ear-
lier when troops marched into Afghanistan the members of the
Soviet Association of International Law had taken no such posi-
tion. On the contrary, the move had been justified as a response
to the Afghan Government's call for aid in resisting threats from
hostile neighbors and as a manifestation of the international
duty of Soviet soldiers to assist their working class brothers
placed in danger.
While the radar and Afghan violations might be evaluated
as isolated episodes, a more far-reaching denunciation of past
policies came from the Foreign Minister fifteen months earlier.
He declared that the long-standing priority given since the 1917
Russian Revolution to foster the "class struggle" in the formula-
tion of foreign policy was to be abandoned.6 The supreme aim
now was to be the achievement of peace for mankind. While So-
viet policy makers will not ignore revolutionaries beyond Soviet
frontiers, for they offer sympathy and even aid to peoples seek-
Shevardnadze: A New Look at Foreign Policy, 41 CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, No.
43, at 1, 5 (1989) (trans. from Pravda, Oct. 24, 1989, at 2) (hereinafter Shevardnadze).
The speech was commented upon by a Soviet journalist, who remarked:
[Niot one commentary about that truly sensational admission has appeared in the
Soviet press. This is [also] an example of the momentous inertia of the past
among our writers on international affairs. Yes, we are still under the spell of old
taboos, even when taboos are being lifted "from above" and sensitive subjects are
being broached publicly in the Supreme Soviet.
S. Kondrashov, On Foreign Policy and Waste, SOVIET LIFE (Embassy of the USSR,
Washington, D.C.) Dec., 1989, No. 12 (399), at 3.
1 Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States of
America-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
See Shevardnadze, supra note 2, at 3.
At its annual meeting in 1980, the Soviet Association of International Law unani-
mously adopted a resolution "condemning the attack of the imperialist states and the
Peking hegemonists on the sovereignty of independent Afghanistan." Summary Report
of XXIII Annual Meeting, 1980 Soy. Y.B. INr'L L. 293 (1981).
' See Shevardnadze, Soviet Foreign Policy's New Look, 40 CURRENT DIG. Soy.
PRESS, No. 30, at 13, 14 (1988) (trans. from Pravda, July 26, 1988, at 4).
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ing to oust colonial governments, they will place such activity
second to the preservation of peace.
When he published Perestroika in 1987, M.S. Gorbachev
gave the signal to Soviet international lawyers to widely develop
the policy of "rethinking." To justify this about-face in Soviet
policy he cited Lenin, saying "[M]ore than once he spoke about
the priority of the interests common to all humanity over class
interests."' Gorbachev argued that "with the emergence of
weapons of mass, that is, universal destruction, there appeared
an objective limit for class confrontation in the international
arena: the threat of universal destruction."8
Lest he be thought to be deserting the Third World with his
evident about-face, Mr. Gorbachev reported that he had told
Mrs. Thatcher of Great Britain that his Soviet people sympa-
thize with liberation movements of peoples fighting for social
justice.9 One of his jurists was prompted by that position to
write in a journal designed for Latin Americans that interna-
tional law justified resistance by the developing world toward
paying their debts incurred while colonies.' 0 Yet, Mr. Gorbachev
drew a distinction between such bating of the creditor nations
and war. In his view class solidarity could no longer be allowed
to ignite a war that might destroy universal human interests.
Another of his jurists, I.I. Lukashuk," encapsulated "new
thinking" when he wrote, "li]t is a philosophy of action to save
mankind. It is concerned with the methodology of conducting
international affairs in a nuclear/space age.' 1 2 Lukashuk may
provide a clue to the motivation for "new thinking" when he re-
fers to the nuclear age. He and his Ukrainian people had exper-
ienced the devastation caused by the Chernobyl fire and subse-
quent emission of radiation. Not only the Ukraine, but the
entire Soviet Union's people had learned that radiation destroys
7 See GORBACHEV, supra note 1, at 145.
8 Id. at 132.
" Id. at 161-62.
'0 M.J. Lazarev, Mezhdunarodno-pravovoi aspekt zadolzhennosti (The Interna-
tional-Legal Aspect of Indebtedness) LATINSKAIA AMERIKA, No. 3, at 22-28 (1988).
11 Lukashuk is a noted Ukrainian professor of international law, and has repre-
sented the Ukrainian Republic to the Legal Committee of the United Nations on several
occasions.
'2 Lecture by I.I. Lukashuk, The "New Political Thinking" and International Law,
Institut fdr Internationales Recht an den Universitiit Kiel, at 6 (15 Nov. 1988).
1990]
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peoples on a wide scale. Thousands of Ukrainians and Byelorus-
sians had to be moved from their homelands, and many died
from exposure before they could be moved.
COMPARING "NEW" AND "OLD"
Of course, "new thinking" has to be seen in light of what
had gone before. The past record is full and has been chronicled
by numerous scholars.' 3 International law was denigrated as the
new Soviet Russia emerged from World War I. Leon Trotsky, as
Commissar of Foreign Affairs, was delegated to make peace with
the Imperial German Army in 1917. As a fiery revolutionary,
Trotsky was not prepared to let pass the opportunity to foment
revolution, which he expected to follow the war - even in Ger-
many. His slogan, as he entered the negotiation was "No
Peace-No War."" His expectation that a German revolution
would force peace upon the Army from within proved to be illu-
sory. Lenin, however, anticipating further devastation by a re-
newed German advance across the steppes, withdrew Trotsky
and instructed his negotiators to make peace at any cost. In ef-
fect, Lenin was recognizing the potential of international law as
a means of saving the fledgling Soviet state.
The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty 5 stands as evidence of
Lenin's flexibility in accepting doctrinally distasteful measures
in order to save his state. However, it was a grudging acceptance.
Lenin was not prepared to accept the body of general inter-
national law that had been accumulated over the preceding cen-
tury. In his eyes it was tainted by its creators-his enemies, the
Imperialist powers of Europe. In his view, this body of law pro-
tected capitalists. It was "bourgeois." Within its norms there
lurked danger to a regime avowedly bent on destroying
capitalism.
An obvious and immediate danger in the post-war world
13 The earliest study in English was T.A. TARACOUZIO, THE SOVIET UNION AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1935). Perhaps the most extensive is K. GRzT owSKI, SOVIET PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW: DOCTRINES AND DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE (1970). A recent brief summary
of early views appears in Butler, International Law, Foreign Policy and the Gorbachev
Style, 42 COLUM. J. INT'L AFF. 367 (1989).
11 L. TROTSKY, My LIFE 381, 383 (1931); G. KENNAN, RUSSIA AND THE WEST UNDER
LENIN AND TROTSKY 43 (1961).
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Mar. 3, 1918.
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was presented by the claims filed by Western powers against the
Soviet treasury for repayment of debts incurred by the Tsarist
and Provisional Governments. In Lenin's view these debts had
been incurred to support governments hostile to social change.
He argued with a question: Why should a government emerging
from a revolutionary change be required to support the interna-
tional law norm on payment of debts by successor govern-
ments? 16 He believed that a social revolution broke the chain.
To Lenin, power passing from one group of a class to another
group from within the same class was not a coup.
In spite of this position, which has been held by the Soviet
Government to the present day, Lenin found it necessary to
compromise in the interests of his new state. However he would
compromise only on a selective basis: no general recognition of
international law was to occur. One example of this compromise
was his position on the issue of state representation abroad.
Lenin thought the diplomatic ranking established by the old Vi-
enna Treaty17 was offensive. He refused to appoint his state's
representatives as Ambassadors and Ministers. They would be
called by a new name, polpred,15 which meant "fully empowered
representative." But this put them at the end of the protocol
queue, and it removed their protection under international law.
When the Soviet polpred in Switzerland was assassinated, Lenin
made his concession. He brought an action for reparations.1"
In a similar vein, an exception had to be made to Lenin's
general denunciation of Tsarist treaties as unequal and forced
upon weaker states. The need for this exception was raised by
the issue of demarcation of the Sino-Soviet frontier. The demar-
cation had been established over time through treaties signed
with China each time Tsarist armies had been victorious. Soviet
governments have always demanded that this frontier be recog-
nized by China, and have been irked when the Chinese have
" See L. FISCHER, THE LIFE OF LENIN 559-60 (1964). The official Soviet position was
drafted by Chicherin, the Foreign Commissar, who stressed the need to recognize tsarist
debts. It was approved by Lenin, and appeared in a conciliatory statement to Western
governments. "The Russian government 'is deeply persuaded that no nation is obliged to
pay the cost of the chains it has worn for ages.' " Id. at 560.
" Congress of Vienna, 1815, and Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818.
"S This is an abbreviation of the words polnyi predstavitel.
". See TARACOUZIO, supra note 13, at 188.
19901
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published maps that contain a different demarcation in the Far
East.
A THEORY TO SUPPORT SELECTIVE RECOGNITION
Soviet academics have a noted penchant for seeking philo-
sophical foundations for novel courses of action. In 1924, they
began to speculate on what to call the Soviet practice of ac-
cepting some norms of general international law and rejecting
others, Professor Eugene A. Korovin was the first to take a posi-
tion. In his book International Law of the Transitional Pe-
riod,0 he maintained that a new international law was being
formed by the new Soviet Russia (in its advance from capitalism
to socialism) as it relied upon some norms and rejected others to
advance its interests.
Korovin's colleagues expanded upon his position and argued
that the law was incorporating a new content, even though old
forms were still utilized in practice. No one in the mid-1920s ex-
pected international relations to be conducted between fraternal
communist parties. The much quoted speech by Trotsky when
he entered the old Tsarist building to greet the Foreign Office
staff seemed visionary. Trotsky is reputed to have shouted, "I
have come to close up the shop.""1 The Berlin "Soviet" on which
Trotsky had based hopes for revolutionary change had been de-
feated, as had the Hungarian "Soviet." Revolution in China
seemed unlikely. It was time to talk peace, and Korovin's book
symbolized the new attitude.
For many years, the United States Government looked
askance at Soviet leaders' intentions. No thought was given to
recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations until 1933.
The principal impediment to resumption of formal ties was
probably the Communist International. This body, founded by
Lenin in 1919, consisted of representatives from various commu-
nist parties from around the world. It had always been engaged
in preparing blueprints for revolution by specifying the most ef-
fective measures to be taken in various areas. The Soviet Com-
20 E.A. KOROVIN, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO PEREKHODNOVO VREMENI (INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF TRANSITIONAL PERIOD) (1923).
"' See V. SERGE AND N. SEDOVA TROTSKY, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF LEON TROTSKY, 72
(A. J. Pomerans trans. 1975).
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munist Party was host to its staff, although the Soviet Govern-
ment professed to have no relation to it. In American eyes it
remained a relic of the heady revolutionary enthusiasm of the
early days.
In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt began negotiating
an agreement with the Soviet Foreign Minister that would lead
to recognition of the Soviet Government. Roosevelt feared that
the Communist International might continue to attempt to un-
dermine the United States Government through its support of
the Communist Party of the U.S. In an effort to reduce the like-
lihood of such support, Roosevelt required the Soviet envoy,
Maxim Litvinov, to sign a commitment:
[n]ot to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any
organization or group-and to prevent the activity on its territory
of any organization or group . . . which has as an aim the over-
throw or the preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing
about by force of a change in, the political or social order of the
whole or any part to the United States, its territories or
possessions."
In 1935 the Communist International convened its World
Congress with American Communists in attendance as delegates.
President Roosevelt protested, through his Secretary of State
Cordell Hull, but to no avail. The Soviet Foreign Ministry re-
plied that the Soviet Government could not be held accountable
for an agency in which it played no part. Of course, all the world
knew that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union played a
major part in supporting the Communist International, and that
the Communist Party monopolized power in the Soviet Union.
Roosevelt found the Soviet Government's reply unacceptable,
and mistrust developed between the two governments that was
not overcome until Hitler's armies invaded the USSR in 1941.
At that time, Roosevelt and Winston Churchill decided that the
fate of the West hung on the defeat of Hitler and that the Soviet
armies would be an important force in the war. Both agreed to
aid Stalin in fighting the war, although the United States was
not yet a combatant. Stalin responded by "abolishing" the Com-
" Letter from Maxim Litvinoff to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Nov. 16, 1933),
reprinted in The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations With the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, DEPARTMENT OF STATE: EASTERN EUROPEAN SERIES, No. 1, at 5 (1933).
1990]
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munist International, but there was no confidence in Washing-
ton that Communists had abandoned their crusade against the
Capitalists. Class struggle continued to be in the air. Mistrust
was evidenced in planning the peace at the Yalta Conference of
1943.23 Roosevelt and Churchill sought commitments from Sta-
lin that Eastern European states upon liberation from the Ger-
man armies would conduct elections to establish governments
that the majority desired.2 4
When Stalin's troops advanced across Eastern Europe to
defeat Hitler in Germany, they brought with them well-prepared
groups of local communists who established communist-domi-
nated governments. In alarm, the Western powers formed the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),25 and what came
to be called the "cold war" was born. The U.S. Congress enacted
the Smith Act 28 and the Communist Control Act, 7 and Ameri-
can Communists were prosecuted in the courts under this legis-
lation until the 1960s.2e Americans were confident that the So-
viet Government supported the American Communists and
continued to foster revolution elsewhere in the world. To Ameri-
cans generally, international law seemed to have been put at a
lesser priority than "class struggle," even more so when Soviet
sponsored motions in the United Nations were analyzed.
KHRUSHCHEV INTRODUCES A MODIFICATION
When Nikita Khrushchev inherited Stalin's mantle soon af-
ter Stalin's death in 1953, he revised the Communist Party's
23 For recollections of the Yalta Conference, see C.E. BOHLEN, WITNESS TO HISTORY
1929-1969, 173-201 (1973).
24 For recollections of the Teheran Conference from the keeper of the record, see id.
at 134-54.
28 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S.
243.
2 Smith Act of 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1990).
27 Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1990).
28 See, e.g., Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963); Emspak v. United States,
349 U.S. 190 (1955); Dennis v.- United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Rogers v. United
States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (prosecutions under the Smith Act). For litigation involving
the Communist Control Act, see e.g., Communist Party of the United States v. Subver-
sive Activities Control Board 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Scales v. United States 367 U.S. 203
(1961); Communist Party, U.S.A. v. Catherwood, Industrial Commissioner 367 U.S. 389
(1961).
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Program to insert a statement on foreign policy, using words
which had been hallowed by Lenin. These words had repre-
sented Lenin's effort to save the fledgling Bolshevik regime in
Soviet Russia from the infinitely stronger forces of the Allied
Powers. He had coined the phrase "peaceful coexistence."29
However, Khrushchev was not prepared to abandon the Third
World. He qualified the affirmation of "peaceful coexistence" as
the policy of the Communist Party by adding that it was estab-
lished to provide peaceful conditions for building communist so-
ciety in the USSR and for developing world socialism.30 To
many Western scholars Khrushchev was only calling an armi-
stice, the better to catch his breath for more class struggle.
Fortuitously, Gregory I. Tunkin who taught international
law in Moscow seized upon the Party's statement of policy to
declare that the Soviet Union was now proposing a "law of
peaceful coexistence."31 This phrase was introduced into an in-
ternational forum at the Dubrovnik Conference of the Interna-
tional Law Association in 1956. The Yugoslavian delegation pro-
posed that this nongovernmental association of scholars adopt it
as a project for research. 32 At the time, the phrase had such im-
precise meaning that Western jurists in the Association thought
that they should move with caution. The American branch of
the Association took the lead in seeking to draft a definition for
"peaceful coexistence" which would meet Western concepts of
what the principal norms of international law in such a concept
should be.33 They wanted to be sure that it would mean more
than an armistice in the class struggle. As has often happened,
" Khrushchev, Report to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party,
Feb. 14, 1956, reprinted in G. HUDSON, R. LOWENTHAL & R. MACFARQUHAR, THE SINO-
SOVIET DISPUTE 43-44 (1961).
30 See 1961 Communist Party Program, (Peaceful Coexistence and the Struggle for
World Peace) in SOVIET COMMUNISM: PROGRAMS AND RULES. OFFICIAL TEXTS OF 1919, 1952
(1956), 1961, at 63-67 (J.F. Triska ed. 1962).
3' See G.I. Tunkin, Mirnoe sosushestvovanie v mezhdunarodnom pravo (Peaceful
Coexistence in International Law), Soy. Gos. & PRAVO, No. 7, 3-13 (1956).
31 See M. Bartos, Aspect juridique de la coexistence pacifique active entre ktats in
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH CONFERENCE, DU-
BROVNIK, 1956, 17-39 (1957). Subsequent steps taken in various international fora are
chronicled in J. Hazard, Legal Research in Peaceful Coexistence, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 63
(1957).
" The drafts presented by the American and Soviet Branches of the International
Law Association are published in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 92-94 (1963).
1990]
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the debate in the Association was carried over into the halls of
the United Nations where Eastern European jurists proposed
that the U.N. Sixth (Legal) Committee take a hand in defining
the term. Perhaps in response to the American argument that
the term should smack not of continuing struggle under an armi-
stice but of cooperation in maintaining peace through law, the
Yugoslavian jurists suggested that the goal should be "active
peaceful coexistence."3
As the debate continued, Western jurists in the U.N. came
to feel that the term was odious as a slogan because it incorpo-
rated the policy of the USSR rather than general international
law to which all had subscribed over decades. They suggested
that any new statement of principles incorporate the concept of
"cooperation." Finally, the draft resolution was entitled
"Friendly Relations and Cooperation," and with this title it
moved through the various chambers until it was adopted in
1970 on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Organization. 5
To Soviet authors on this topic, the new term seemed to be
only a euphemism for their favored term, for they continued to
write of the resolution as incorporating the principles of "peace-
ful coexistence." Evidently, they still thought it necessary to
hold to a shadow, if not more, of the long favored and fostered
expectation that world revolution led by communists would
eventually triumph in the class struggle. Their attention fo-
cussed on developing countries, because the Western world had
outgrown its malaise following the Second World War. It seemed
unlikely that communism would appeal to many in Western
lands or in Asia, except for China and its immediate neighbors
in Korea and Vietnam.
In this environment Tunkin propounded in 1970 a revision
of his theory. 6 It was stated in the form of an explanation of the
process through which international law was emerging. He ar-
gued that norms were agreed upon through a "concurrence (co-
' See sources cited supra note 32.
35 The full title is The Declaration of Principles in International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, Oct. 24, 1970, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121,
U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
" For extensive treatment of the topic, see G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 21-48 (W.E. Butler trans. 1974).
[Vol. 2:1
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ordination) of wills." '3 7 It seems that he was inspired by the
Marxist doctrine that law represents the will of the ruling class
in each society. Such a theory could be supported in some coun-
tries and during some historic periods, such as the period follow-
ing the French Revolution. Using this theory to explain interna-
tional law however seemed problematic to other authors such as
Korovin. Marxists argued that Western law was inspired by cap-
italists protecting their interests while Soviet law was formu-
lated to protect the working class, or socialist interests. Diffi-
culty arose in deciding how to characterize a law binding on
both groups of states if it emerged from two different sources.
Tunkin's explanation of "concurrence of wills" seemed to ad-
dress this difficulty and was accepted by most of his colleagues.
It is possible that Tunkin's concept of a concurrence creat-
ing a new "will" (something between the poles of bourgeois and
socialist class distinction) resembles a reconsidered view of
Korovin's "law of the transitional period." In Korovin's view,
the two hostile wills would merge into a concurrence of wills for
the purpose of keeping the peace-a peace from which each rul-
ing class hoped to benefit.3 8 This explained the Soviet goal of
"peaceful coexistence" as a transitional condition until socialism
might eventually triumph.
However, this concept was not entirely clear. Some thought
that Tunkin had a lesser expectation of the ultimate triumph of
socialism than Korovin for he began to say that his goal was "co-
operation." Perhaps Tunkin had only lengthened the transi-
tional period. Korovin had to be read in light of what was being
written in the mid-1920s, a period in which Soviet scholars ar-
gued that coercion as manifested in law would, as Marxists ex-
pected, "wither away" as class struggle in domestic society
abated." Soviet draftsmen began to prepare codes offering
judges opportunities to use broad discretion in determining how
those who were brought before them should be sentenced.4 Civil
31 G. TUNKIN, LAW AND FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, 63 (1985).
See KOROVIN, supra note 20, at 135-36.
3 Lenin discusses the Marxist and Engelsian concept of "withering away" in LENIN,
THE STATE AND REVOLUTION (1919), reprinted in THE LENIN ANTHOLOGY 311, 320-25, 369-
84 (R.C. Tucker ed. 1975).
40 See Hazard, The Abortive Codes of the Pashukanis School in CODIFICATION IN
THE COMMUNIST WORLD 145-75 (F.J.M. Feldbrugge ed. 1975).
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law was already being dropped from teaching programs and re-
placed by an economic law governing the relations between state
enterprises. Communism seemed to be in the near offing. In
Tunkin's time, such expectation of immediate communism was
accepted as visionary. He had reason to focus attention on the
immediate need of his country, which he interpreted as being a
calm international environment.
WESTERN REACTION TO ACCOMMODATION
Quite frankly, few Western jurists thought it necessary to
discern a will behind the formation of international law in which
opposing class-oriented governments had concurred. In prag-
matic terms popular among Westerners, treaties were negotiated
to seek agreement between statesmen representing governments
who defended a variety of policies. These agreements might be
based on any number of desiderata, quite distinct from class
struggle motivation. Supporters of such pragmatic explanations
were heartened when a distinguished Soviet jurist with experi-
ence in the Human Rights division of the United Nations Secre-
tariat, Valerie Kartashkin, expressed his disagreement with
Tunkin's "concurrence of wills" theory.41 Kartashkin simplified
the explanation by saying that agreements result from "compro-
mise." He seemed to sense no need to refer to "wills.' 2
A new spirit seemed to be emerging within the United Na-
tions. Sharp contrast between old and new thinking became evi-
dent in proposals made by the socialist delegations. Prior to
1934 Stalin had castigated the U.N.'s predecessor, the League of
Nations, as a cabal of capitalist powers to be shunned by the
USSR. It was not until Hitler increased the military potential of
Nazi Germany and evidenced his hostility toward communists
that Stalin began to seek allies in defense of the USSR. He
" Kartashkin argued that there is no coordination of wills of competing socialist
and capitalist systems since "in the process of creating norms and principles of interna-
tional law the will and ultimate aims of a state remains invariable." In his view agree-
ment is reached by compromise in the interest of peaceful coexistence and neither state
moves from its basic ideological position. Kartashkin, The Marxist-Leninist Approach:
The Theory of Class Struggle and Contemporary International Law, in THE STRUCTURE
AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE AND THE-
ORY, 83-84, 101 n.7 (R. Macdonald & D. Johnston ed. 1983).
42 Id.
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turned to the League of Nations and asked for membership. Co-
operation with Western capitalist-oriented powers in resisting'
the threat of fascism became the focal point of Stalin's policies
for five years. Stalin then sought protection in a new direction.
He concluded that Britain and France would not support him,
and in 1939 he turned to Hitler and signed the notorious Molo-
tov-Ribbentrop Pact 3 and the then-secret protocol to divide
Eastern Europe between German and Soviet spheres of
influence.""
Stalin was deceived by his partner, apparently to his sur-
prise. The Nazi armies began to roll across the steppes of the
Ukraine in 1941. The wartime alliance with the West was
formed, leading to development in principle at Dumbarton Oaks
for a new League of Nations in San Francisco in 1945. The
USSR became a Charter member. Cooperation between East
and West looked possible as the basis for reconstruction of a
revitalized world, but the euphoria was not to last.
This is not an occasion requiring retracing of the years of
disillusionment for the Western governments. Those years are
well remembered. The Security Council of the United Nations
was made impotent by vetoes. The General Assembly became a
voting block for the Second and Third Worlds in the eyes of
some Western Chiefs of Permanent Missions.
The International Court of Justice was ignored as unlikely
to be impartial in deciding any dispute between East and West,
although a Soviet and a Polish jurist were both elected to sit.
There was no hint that the USSR would accept compulsory ju-
risdiction, even when disputes over interpretation of treaties rat-
ified by the USSR would normally be heard by the Court under
dispute resolution provisions. The Soviet Government, in ratify-
ing these treaties, took care to file a reservation against such
jurisdiction."'
" Aug. 23, 1939. See Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Protocol, 40 CURRENT DIG. Soy.
PREss, No. 34, at 7 (1989) (trans. from Pravda, Aug. 18, 1989, at 1).
" Address by N.S. Beryzhkov, Columbia University (Oct. 10 1989). Stalin's inter-
preter and biographer, N.S. Beryzhkov, gave this explanation for Stalin's pact with
Hitler during reminiscences given at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University on
Oct. 10, 1989. The cassette recording of the lecture is on file at the publications office of
the Harriman Institute.
45 See, e.g., Reservation to Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Ved. Verkh.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW MovEs TOWARD SEGMENTATION
International law as a universally accepted body of norms
was increasingly threatened. One of the Soviet scholars, later to
be elected a Judge on the International Court of Justice, pub-
lished a treatise in which he argued that a new socialist interna-
tional law was coming into existence as socialist states multi-
plied and came to speak of themselves as members of a "socialist
commonwealth."4 Members of this commonwealth and Marxist
oriented states in Africa and Asia claimed to look to socialist
international law as governing their relations. The law of "peace-
ful coexistence" was reserved for relations between socialist and
capitalist blocs.
Tunkin came to oppose this differentiation, perhaps sensing
future danger to Soviet interests should there be no generally
accepted law binding all states to the same terms. He began to
argue that there was a "general international law" comprised of
norms established by custom and binding all states.47 His views
would hardly have appealed to those of his predecessors who
had concluded that international law was bourgeois because of
its origin in the practice of imperialist states during the nine-
teenth century. However, the pendulum was swinging away from
Western conceptions of international law within the General As-
sembly of the United Nations and toward the views of the in-
creasingly numerous members of the Third World. Supported
often by the avowedly socialist states, the character of interna-
tional legal norms being applied by much of the world's chan-
ceries was acceptable to the diplomats of the USSR. Soviet dele-
gates to the Committees of the United Nations concurred in
many of the steps leading up to General Assembly resolutions
that incorporated new norms. While Western scholars railed
Sov. SSSR, item 772 (1986).
"a See F. KOZHEVNIKOV, SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO 1917-
1947 (OPYT ISTORIKO-PRAVOVOGO ISSLEDOVANIIA) (THE SOVIET STATE AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1917-1947 (AN EXPERIMENT IN HISTORICAL-LEGAL RESEARCH)), 24 (1948).
47 Tunkin's views were interpreted in this vein by W.E. Butler in Note, "Socialist
International Law" or "Socialist Principles of International Relations", 65 AM. J. INT'L
L. 800 (1971). He wrote in criticism of J.N. Hazard's interpretation as posited in Hazard,
Renewed Emphasis on Socialist International Law, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (1971). But
see Osakwe, Socialist International Law Revisited 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 596 (1972), support-
ing Hazard's interpretation. Mr.Osakwe is a former graduate student of Tunkin's.
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against the resolutions as efforts to create "instant custom," So-
viet scholars piled no such ridicule upon the resolutions.48
Gorbachev's "new thinking" is breaking with past attitudes.
His strongly expressed support for the United Nations and its
associated agencies has been concretized both in the literature
emerging from Soviet scholars and in the practice of the Soviet
Ministry of International Affairs. Two prominent Soviet interna-
tionalists published a paper in early 1988 defining their interpre-
tation of "new thinking.' 9 To them it meant: abandonment of
the policy of applying force to achieve goals, strict adherence to
the rule of law in the conduct of relations, rejection of policies
reflecting narrow group interests, recognition of the interdepen-
dence of states, voluntary limitation of state sovereignty on a
mutual basis, strengthening of international mechanisms of con-
trol designed to resolve disputes and to prevent violations of law
and even the enhancement of the role of non-governmental orga-
nizations. They called for "popular democracy," supplemented,
perhaps, by what Mr. Gorbachev had already called a "global
consultative council uniting the world's intellectual elite under
United Nations auspices. ' ' 0
At the same time, a more junior scholar published a mono-
graph setting forth proposals for strengthening the United Na-
tions.51 Some of his ideas emerged later when Mr. Gorbachev
presented his 1988 address to the United Nations, 2 suggesting
that the points to be made by Mr. Gorbachev were already being
discussed in the halls of the Academy. In his monograph, Krylov
suggested that the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General As-
sembly should initiate draft Conventions and that the Security
4' This characterization of General Assembly Resolutions has been attributed to the
orator giving the Lord McNair Memorial Lecture at the International Law Association
1976 Conference, although it does not appear in the printed version. See R.Y. Jennings,
The Discipline of International Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT
OF THE FIFTY-SEVENTH CONFERENCE, MADRID, 30 Aug., 1976 (1977).
" See V. Vereshcheten & R. Mullerson, Novoe myshlenie i mezhdunarodnoe
pravo(New Thinking and International Law) Soy. Gos. & PRAVO, No. 3, 3-9 (1988).
" See M. Gorbachev, Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World, 39 CURRENT DIG.
Soy. PRESS, No.38 at 16, 18 (1987) (trans. from Pravda, Sept. 17, 1987, at 1); Bortin,
Soviet Leader Calls for Creation of U.N. Elite Grouping, Reuter Library Report, Sept.
17, 1987.
" See N.B. KRYLov, PRAVOTVORSHESTSKAIA DEIATEL'NOST' MEZHDUNARODNYKH OR-
GANIZATSII (LAW CREATING ACTIVITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS) 167-75 (1988).
5" See 48 REPRINTS FROM THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 1, at 5 (Jan. 15, 1989).
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Council should hold sessions not only to meet crises, but to per-
form its obligation under the Charter to survey the international
situation. The author also urged that the Security Council invite
the heads of state and government to attend sessions to be held
not only at Headquarters but at capitals of permanent members
of the Council. Finally, he proposed that the long-moribund Mil-
itary Staff Committee should be revitalized to send military ad-
visers to trouble spots, such as the Persian Gulf during the Iran-
Iraq war to prepare factual reports on the situation.
REFLECTION OF "NEW THINKING" IN PRACTICE
Soviet practice began to downgrade the class struggle moti-
vation which had characterized the earlier years. The most elec-
trifying evidence of "new thinking" from the point of view of
international lawyers was the official acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The USSR en-
acted legislation accepting compulsory jurisdiction for disputes
that arise regarding the interpretation of conventions on geno-
cide, women's rights, political rights, racial discrimination, gen-
der discrimination and torture.53
Negotiations are proceeding between the five powers in the
Security Council that have veto rights to withdraw reservations
to multilateral treaty provisions establishing International Court
of Justice jurisdiction when disputes arise over interpretation.
Although the negotiations may be extended, there is an expecta-
tion that under current thinking, they will be successful.
A straw in the wind comes from Soviet scholars who suggest
that the phrase "international law of peaceful coexistence" is
now misleading. The argument is that since the use of force or
threat of force is now prohibited by the United Nations Charter
and by general international law, the "law of peaceful coexis-
tence" is subsumed under general international law. It has be-
come redundant.5 4
Perhaps proof of this redundancy may be found in the So-
viet official reaction to the United States' incursion into Panama
in December, 1989. 55 The Soviet spokesman was quick to express
11 Law of Feb. 10, 1989, Ved. Verkh. Sov. SSSR, item 79 (1989).
14 Address by N.B. Krylov, Columbia Law School (Nov. 29, 1989).
15 See Foreign Affairs, 41 CURRENT DIG. Sov. PRESS, No. 51, at 18, 22-23 (1989)
[Vol. 2:1
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/1
NEW THINKING
his view that although the action was a violation of international
law, he thought this violation would not interfere with East-
West relations. His thought was subsequently borne out, for re-
lations have continued with no more acrimony over this incident
than sharp comments by Deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet
when Secretary of State James Baker spoke before its Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations in Moscow in February, 1990.6 There
was no move by the Soviet Government to arouse the masses of
the world on any dogmatic ground related to "class struggle."
Rein Mullerson, a prominent Soviet international legal
scholar, 7 perhaps signalled a few months earlier that dogmatic
writing was no longer appropriate.5 He was prepared to admit
that Soviet doctrine in international law still contained too
much dogmatism. He quoted approvingly the words of his col-
league G.H. Shakhnazarov, former President of the Soviet Polit-
ical Science Association, to the effect that in formulating Soviet
foreign 'policy, ideological factors "play no greater role than
those derived from economic development or political re-
gimes."59 In short, the differences between economic and social
structures, upon which Soviet scholars have so often written
when comparing bourgeois and socialist states, are not the pri-
mary motives driving the formulators of foreign policy.
(trans. from Pravda, Dec. 22, 1989, at 1).
[T]he United States has committed an act of outright international
lawlessness.
The cynicism of the act consists in the claim that this is being done "to de-
fend democracy" in Panama.
The Soviet Union calls on the United States administration to halt its inter-
national actions with respect to sovereign Panama.
" Address by Secretary of State James Baker to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, Moscow (Feb. 9, 1990). Text of February 9, 1990 press conference as released by
the U.S. State Department, from the Novosti Press Center, Moscow, USSR.
87 Mullerson is currently representing the USSR on the Human Rights Committee
formed under the Convention on Human Rights.
88 See Mullerson, Sources of International Law: New Tendencies in Soviet Think-
ing, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 497 (1989).
8" See id. at 497 (footnote omitted).
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NON-IDEOLOGICAL POLICY FORMULATION
The Central Committee of the Communist Party has ap-
proved a new program declaring that a rule-of-law state of the
whole people has no place for dictatorship of any class. ° The
Committee has also reformed the USSR Constitution to open
the way for the development of a multi-party system and the
institution of privatization of means of production. These and
other recent dramatic events in Soviet domestic affairs place the
direction of future moves in foreign policy in question. Will the
external policy likewise reflect renunciation of ideologies long as-
sociated with the leadership of the USSR?
A case in point to test the thesis that ideology is dead is the
discussion between the USSR and the Western powers over the
reunification of Germany. Seventy-three years ago the Soviets
negotiating with the Imperial German Army at Brest-Litovsk"1
put class warfare at the top of their desiderata. For a time, it
seemed that Trotsky was willing to risk further advance of the
German Army into Russia under his "No Peace-No War Pol-
icy '" 2 while he awaited a rising of German workers behind the
lines to undercut the Imperial Government in Berlin. Only when
the expectation failed to materialize did Lenin call off Trotsky
and proceed to negotiate a treaty. Reliance upon international
law seems to have emerged in Lenin's thinking only because
there was no other way to save his new government. Class strug-
gle remained his priority, but it had to be subordinated to the
necessity of saving the state.
In 1990, the Soviet Foreign Minister stands fast on the Four
Power Agreement on the Future of Germany 3 to work out (with
his partners, Britain, France and the United States) a program
to determine mutually acceptable terms regarding the future of
Germany. In Soviet eyes, a pillar of the plan must be continued
acceptance of the Helsinki Pact" guaranteeing post-World War
60 See GORBACHEV, supra note 1, at 245, 293-96.
61 See supra note 15.
" See TROTSKY, supra note 14, at 381, 383.
63 Quadripartite Agreement On Berlin, Sept. 3, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 283, T.I.A.S. No.
7551, 880 U.N.T.S. 115.
4 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975 re-
printed in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
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II frontiers. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) came into
being under conditions not alone of security needs, but of ideo-
logical systems that were forming in Eastern Europe. The GDR
is to be permitted to pass from the ideological camp, as long as
security considerations are taken into account.65 Soviet negotia-
tors are looking for restraints upon a unified Germany to protect
their state. However, there is no reference, even in rhetoric, to
Ideological aims; to an international duty to aid fellow "social-
ists"; or to the fraternal relations between communists.
Perhaps there has surfaced a realization that hostility to the
USSR over earlier decades was stimulated not by a desire to
conquer it, but rather because the USSR's leadership gave the
impression to Western statesmen that it hoped to spread social-
ism throughout the world. Afanasyev, a Soviet historian and
member of the Congress of People's Deputies, has suggested
that such a realization has come to the fore in Soviet thinking.
He posits that "new thinking" is possible because Gorbachev
and his colleagues have concluded that the ideological militancy
of their predecessors stimulated hostility,6 and that if this were
to be abandoned, the Soviets need no longer fear the West.
Thus, a long-term policy of preserving peace could be pursued.
Of course, in international relations, each country's states-
men jockey to gain a diplomatic advantage in one or another sit-
uation. This has always been so, even among allies, and presum-
ably it will continue to be so. Soviet negotiators can be expected
to press their cause. "New thinking" has not changed this type
of conduct, but it does suggest that the "class struggle" motive
has been subordinated for an indefinite period, if not forever, to
the realization of purely national goals.
65 See Gumbel, Soviets, in Policy Reversal, Drop Demand for Neutral German
State, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1990, at All, col. 1.
" See Womack, Moscow Needs Reform to Stay a Superpower, Pravda Editor Says,
Reuter Library Report, Jan. 10, 1988.
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